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Abstract In recent years, the Darknet has become one of the most discussed top-
ics in cyber security circles. Current academic studies and media reports tend to 
highlight how the anonymous nature of the Darknet is used to facilitate criminal 
activities. This paper reports on a recent research in four Darknet forums that reveals 
a different aspect of the Darknet. Drawing on our qualitative findings, we suggest 
that many users of the Darknet might not perceive it as intrinsically criminogenic, 
despite their acknowledgement of various kinds of criminal activity in this network. 
Further, our research participants emphasised on the achievement of constructive 
socio-political values through the use of the Darknet. This achievement is enabled 
by various characteristics that are rooted in the Darknet’s technological structure, 
such as anonymity, privacy, and the use of cryptocurrencies. These characteristics 
provide a wide range of opportunities for good as well as for evil.
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Introduction
The Darknet has become, in the last few years, one of the most discussed top-
ics in cyber security circles. To some, the hidden networks in the Internet are a 
means to achieve freedom; while to others these networks are no more than new 
outlets to express their criminogenic desires. In general, the Darknet tends to be 
portrayed by various news media as an environment wherein criminal activities 
flourish naturally, even to the extent of being criminogenic. Many news media 
outlets highlight that the Darknet and its Tor browser are overwhelmingly used 
for criminal activities (Chandran 2015; Farrell 2017; McGoogan 2016; Molo-
ney 2016; Samson 2017; Weissman 2015). Two example newspapers headlines 
are ‘Dark Net may pose ‘disruptive risk’ to internet sector’ (Samson 2017) and 
‘Dark web browser Tor is overwhelmingly used for crime, says study’ (McGoo-
gan 2016). This negative perception of the Darknet is also taken by governments 
and ordinary citizens at large, which may drive unnecessary moral panics and 
misguided policies (Murray 2014). The previous head of the UK GCHQ, for 
example, has likened the Dark Net to the Wild West, claiming that it needs to be 
controlled (Omand 2016).
In academic circles, previous criminological research appears to have height-
ened the perception that the Darknet drives criminality—depicting it as a safe 
haven for criminals to undertake a range of criminal activities, such as the anon-
ymous trading of illegal goods (e.g. drugs) via cryptocurrencies (e.g. Bitcoin) 
(Buxton and Bingham 2015; UNODC 2014). The trading of illegal drugs, in fact, 
is the most prevalent activity on the Darknet (Dolliver 2015; Owen and Savage 
2015). In January 2016 alone, the total drug revenues, excluding prescription 
drugs, on the Darknet crypto-drug markets were estimated to be between $12 and 
$21.1 million (Kruithof et  al. 2016). These crypto-drug markets are of serious 
concern to law enforcement agencies around the world (Horton-Eddison and Di 
Cristofaro 2017). Other illegal transactions on these markets include the trad-
ing of weapons, credit card and other personal information, and exotic animals 
(BBC 2017; Chertoff and Simon 2015; Holm 2017). The growth of the Darknet 
markets is enabled by various technological characteristics of the network, such 
as anonymity, privacy, and the use of cryptocurrencies. Holm (2017), for exam-
ple, claims that the anonymous nature of the Darknet amplifies threats of identity 
theft. Further, general risk and threats from the Darknet have not been thoroughly 
investigated either (e.g. Byrne and Kimball 2017). Most research projects on 
the Darknet were focused on criminal activities and their technical aspects (e.g. 
Qiang et al. 2014; Wright 2008; Zheng et al. 2013). Only a few very recent pro-
jects tried to assess the sociological and psychological dimensions of the Darknet 
(Everett 2015; Lacson and Jones 2016; Van Hout and Bingham 2013).
This paper reports on a small-scale research project that was carried out on the 
Darknet. The overall aim of the research was to identify whether the Darknet is 
inherently criminogenic, and thus constitutes a fundamental threat to individuals, 
organisations, and societies. Based on a qualitative research conducted in four 
Darknet forums, we were able to identify five main themes from our findings, 
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which together present an alternative view of the Darknet. The Darknet might not 
be intrinsically criminogenic—it does not naturally increase criminal activities; 
rather it might just be another tool that is used by some individuals to carry out 
illicit activities. Some key characteristics of the Darknet, including its anonymous 
nature, virtual markets, and cryptocurrencies have, of course, simply made it eas-
ier for these activities to be carried out.
The Darknet in a nutshell
Technological structure
Although the term Darknet was initially coined in the 1970s, to refer to networks 
isolated from The Advanced Research Projects Agency Network (ARPANET) (Pace 
2017), only recently has the public become aware of it. Simply put, it is the only net-
work on the Internet (a set of interconnected networks), wherein all network traffic is 
hidden. Thus, anyone can carry out any activity without leaving traces that could be 
tracked by commonplace technical tools—a place where perfect anonymity might, 
as a result, be possible.
The Darknet or Dark Web is a subset of the Deep Web, which is approximately 
400–500 times larger than the Surface Web also known as the Internet that we usu-
ally use (Rudesill et al. 2015). Websites that reside on the Surface Web/Internet are 
stored on servers waiting to be retrieved. These websites are mostly HTML files with 
fixed content available in the same format to anyone who makes requests. Unlike the 
Surface Web, connections in the Deep Web are only made between trusted peers 
that are required to be part of the hidden network. Thus, websites are dynamic and 
mostly in a continuous change of servers, meaning that one link might lead to some-
thing at a particular time, and at another time it might lead to something else or 
nothing (Moore and Rid 2016). The hidden websites that reside on these private net-
works can only be accessed by specific software, configurations, or authorizations, 
such as Freenet, I2P, and Tor (Byrne and Kimball 2017). For example, Tor is a very 
popular browser, with an estimated over 4,000,000 users in January 2018 (The Tor 
Project n.d.). Thousands of volunteers around the world run relays and nodes that 
enable the running of anonymous network traffic. If anyone gains access to a node, 
then the person can see the traffic that runs through it but cannot see where it comes 
from and where it goes to next. The anonymous nature of the Darknet and its virtual 
market is protected using cryptocurrencies, e.g. Bitcoin (Buxton and Bingham 2015; 
Hardy and Norgaard 2016).
Social activities on the Darknet
The Darknet is used for a wide range of social activities (Moore and Rid 2016). 
These range from being clearly morally acceptable, across to being considered as 
illicit by some people, or to being clearly criminal based on national and/or inter-
national legislative frameworks. These activities could be grouped into three main 
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categories: (i) activism, journalism, and whistle-blowing; (ii) criminal activities 
in virtual markets; and (iii) cyber security threats including botnets, malware, and 
ransomware.
First, online anonymity provided by the Darknet is used for social and politi-
cal purposes (Moore and Rid 2016). Individuals can openly share their social and 
political beliefs; and their disagreements with, or expectations of, their governments 
without fear of retribution. This sharing is especially necessary in countries with 
strong state censorship and surveillance against political activists, freedom fighters, 
and journalists (Jardine 2015). Journalists, activists, and whistle-blowers in these 
countries could use the Darknet to communicate with the outside world, encourage 
social change, and political reform, without disclosing their identities (Chertoff and 
Simon 2015). Nearly all types of organisations intend to keep their electronic infor-
mation exchanges in safe places (Wall 2013). This is also the case with journalists, 
activists, and whistle-blowers. In fact, the use of Tor is recommended by ‘Reports 
Without Borders’ as one of its ‘survival kits’ for journalists and activists working in 
repressive countries (Murray 2014). During the Egyptian riots, for example, journal-
ists and activists from around the world bypassed government censorship through 
Tor. They thus successfully informed the world about what was happening in Egypt 
(Stacey 2017). Whistle-blowing is the act of leaking governments’ or companies’ 
private information to the public. Some argue that the public have the right to be 
informed about the activities of both their governments and large companies (Green-
wald et al. 2013). Regardless of that in some countries, leaking private information 
from governmental files is considered to be treasonable, e.g. the UK. Moreover, 
leaking information from companies is illegal in some countries, e.g. the US Edward 
Snowden, the most infamous whistle-blower, has leaked sensitive information from 
the United States government, most of this information involved the NSA and the 
US army (Brown 2014; Macaskill and Dance 2013) and was charged under the 1917 
Espionage Act (Finn and Horwitz 2013). He has allegedly used the Tor network to 
send secret information about the surveillance program PRISM to a number of jour-
nalists (Paganini 2013).
Second, a large number of virtual markets on the Darknet specialise in the trad-
ing of illegal drugs (Duxbury and Haynie 2017). Stolen identities, credit card infor-
mation, weapons, and contract killing are also popular ‘goods and services’ on this 
network (Chertoff and Simon 2015; Holm 2017). One of the most famous Dark-
net markets—the Silk Road—was said to promote decentralisation of governments 
and socio-political movements against law enforcement agencies (Greenberg 2013; 
Robinson 2012). Since 2011 when the Silk Road dominated the Darknet’s market-
place, its anonymous ecosystem has evolved significantly (Soska and Christin 2015). 
The business model is similar with the online market place eBay. Users could leave, 
for example, feedback on products, and a system called ‘escrow’ was set up to pro-
tect the sellers and the buyers, and to resolve any possible disputes (Afilipoaie and 
Shortis 2015). Due to its high profile, law enforcement agencies soon started to take 
down the Silk Road (Rushe 2014). After the original Silk Road was shut down in 
October 2013, the 2nd version—Silk Road 2.0—came online under different man-
agements. Later, a 3rd version—Silk Road Reloaded—was created after the closure 
of Silk Road 2.0 (BBC 2015; Olson 2013). Soon, other markets including ‘Black 
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Market Reloaded’ and ‘Sheep Marketplace’—with websites, forums, or even dis-
covery services—emerged to take Silk Road’s place (Van Buskirk et  al. 2014). A 
couple of years ago, Soska and Christin (2015) estimated that the entire Darknet 
marketplace ecosystem generated between $150 and $180 million in revenue annu-
ally. The rise of the Darknet markets demonstrates the degree of resilience of these 
anonymous online ecosystems. It also questions whether law enforcement agencies 
can effectively regulate these markets.
Third, the Darknet is a hot bed for cyber security threats and risks. Hacking tools 
that could directly or indirectly be used to attack companies or other individuals are 
traded on some Darknet markets (Van Buskirk et al. 2016). Malware authors have 
been using the Darknet to communicate and exchange ideas. The Mevade Botnet 
saw an increase to 5 million daily users after incorporating a Tor anonymity net-
work. The ChewBacca malware uses the Tor infrastructure to obtain its victims’ IP 
addresses and record their keyboard strokes; while the i2Ninja malware is known to 
maintain secure communications between the infected devices, and command and 
control server through the I2P hidden network (Maor 2013, 2015; Novitski 2014; 
Preuss 2013). Ransomware instals viruses on infected computers, scramble and 
encrypt all data these can access, and then demand payments in the form of Bitcoin 
to release the data. The Tor network has become indispensable to the prevalence of 
ransomware applications (Wyke and Ajjan 2015). Certainly, the Darknet, along with 
the invention of Bitcoins has provided profitable businesses for criminals (Edwards 
2016).
Methods
Given that there are continuous debates over what the key characteristics of cyber-
crime and cyber criminals are (e.g. Williams and Levi 2015), a study on the Darknet 
ought to be challenging, and thus ought to merit recognition. Previous research on 
the Darknet has tended to be technical in nature. Researchers primarily used techni-
cal skills, such as traffic analysis (Biryukov et al. 2014) and web-crawling (Dolliver 
and Kenney 2016; Moore and Rid 2016; Soska and Christin 2015) to understand the 
hidden websites. In the largest study related to Tor hidden services, at the time of 
the research, for example, Owen and Savage (2016) collected approximately 80,000 
hidden services, using 40 onion relays over a period of 6 months. These approaches 
were used to identify the nature and characteristics of the websites and their users’ 
activities on the Darknet. They could not, however, provide any understandings of 
perceptions and thoughts of users of the Darknet. As our study intended to examine 
the sociological dimensions of the Darknet, we took a different approach.
Here, we explore the two overarching research questions below:
• Is the Darknet a natural environment within which criminal activity can flourish?
• If so, could the Darknet be described, in fact, as criminogenic?
Our research provides some insights into whether individuals predominantly use the 
Darknet to take advantage of its technological features to conduct a range of criminal 
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activities. It aims to identify whether the Darknet is inherently criminogenic, and 
thus constitutes a fundamental threat to individuals, organisations, and societies. A 
qualitative approach provided the basis for our empirical research. By way of quali-
tative interviews carried out in the style of an online survey, the empirical work took 
the participants through a series of 10 questions on four different Darknet forums. 
We would, of course, have preferred standard semi-structured face-to-face inter-
views. However, the option was ruled out since we needed to respect various ethical 
considerations raised by our ethics committee, and the anonymous culture of the 
Darknet. Thus, we formulated 10 interview questions and transposed these into an 
online survey using the Bristol Online Survey (BOS) tool (https ://www.onlin esurv 
eys.ac.uk).
The link to the survey was imbedded in an invitation letter, which was posted in 
four forums that reside on the Darknet—The Hub (thehub7gqe43miyc.onion); Intel 
Exchange (rrcc5uuudhh4oz3c.onion); Darknet Central (2u7kil26qazmrmb6.onion); 
and DarknetM Avengers (avengerfxkkmt2a6.onion). These forums were selected 
because these were platforms for general everyday discussions and were not dedi-
cated to specific purposes. Subjected to an anonymous registration process, these 
forums are free for anyone to use, and provide a sample that closely reflects Darknet 
users coming from diverse backgrounds, and also, having disparate reasons behind 
their use of the Darknet. Forum users who wished to participate in this research 
could simply click on the live link and answer these 10 questions via the BOS tool. 
They could withdraw at any time and had the option to not submit their answers.
Although the Darknet is a vast place, with more and more experimental search 
engines created daily, the forums that were used to conduct this research were not 
easy to locate. First, there is no unique public database that stores all the Darknet 
websites. The process to search for suitable forums can be a dangerous task, as some 
databases (both on the Surface and Deep Web) that contain Darknet websites are 
known to publish links that lead to malicious websites. Secondly, for various ethical 
reasons, not all forums on the Darknet could be used to conduct this research. Each 
forum on the Darknet has its internal regulations, e.g. prohibiting any research activ-
ities. Furthermore, some forums required rigorous vetting processes prior to partici-
pating in any activities, e.g. posting. Overcoming these difficulties, we managed to 
identify four suitable forums that allowed for our research to take place.
Convenience sampling is our chosen sampling method for two main reason. Those 
are i) to accommodate to the anonymous culture and the constantly changing member-
ship of the Darknet; and ii) to obtain a sensible approximation of ordinary users’ views 
on the Darknet. Furthermore, to respect the culture of the Darknet, we guaranteed total 
anonymity and did not ask for any personal information. To avoid being accused of 
spamming, we only posted the invitation note in these four forums once. We analysed 
17 completed responses, to the 10 questions, from 17 users of these four forums. These 
responses provided valuable information on the nature of the Darknet, and some pos-
sible security threats it could generate. The data collected were analysed using thematic 
analysis, which is useful when investigating uncovered areas or under-researched sub-
jects (Braun and Clarke 2006). This approach was appropriate because the Darknet 
was a recent phenomenon, and therefore its users were not very well understood. We 
wished to achieve an understanding of subjective experience by gaining insights into 
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individuals’ motivations and actions. Of course, these individuals’ views were deter-
mined by a range of factors, such as the forums, in which they resided. These forums 
were platforms for general everyday discussions. Thus, individuals participated in the 
forums would be those who were more willing to engage with the general social pur-
poses of the Darknet. They might also be individuals who had long been concerned 
with the predominant image of the Darknet being a natural ground of crime, and thus, 
had long been eager to express their views. Therefore, our research is only designed to 
offer an alternative view of the Darknet.
Main findings and discussions
Findings from our empirical research are presented and analysed under five main 
themes that were identified during the thematic analysis.
Darknet is not underground
First, the participants were asked where they heard about the Darknet. When people 
talk about the Darknet, they often portray the dark side of the Internet (Farrell 2017; 
McGoogan 2016; Samson 2017). The Darknet can be considered as having an ‘under-
ground’ element, and thus it is natural to assume that those who use it have discov-
ered it in other underground environments. However, some of our participants clearly 
stated that they found out about the Darknet from conventional open sources, includ-
ing schools, news media, and other Surface Web discussion forums. Today, a simple 
Google search offers numerous websites with tutorials on how to get on the Dark-
net (Egan 2016; Kumar 2014). Over three quarter of our participants (13 out of 17) 
claimed that they use the Darknet every day while the remaining participants (4 out of 
17) mentioned that they visit the Darknet occasionally. The participants do not consider 
the Darknet as an underground phenomenon. For some examples, see the two extracts 
below:
R10: ‘When I was a teenager, our information teacher told us about a strange 
thing called “Darknet” and at the same time, he talked about some actual whis-
tle blowers who used the Darknet for their activities, I found it interesting, so I 
decided to look it up on google Every day’.
R11: ‘I learned about the darknet through reading an article on Gizmodo about 
it. It was a pretty neutral article explaining indexing, the tor browser etc. I use it a 
few times a week’.
Extracts from responses on online forums, May 2016
Darknet’s anonymity provided freedom of expression
Next, we asked our participants why they participated in the Darknet and what 
the most interesting/appealing feature of this environment was. A simple online 
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search on the key words of ‘Darknet’ and ‘Dark Web’ would display results that 
put the Darknet in a negative light by repeatedly associating words including, 
‘illicit’, ‘shady’, ‘disruptive’, ‘creepiest’, or ‘infamous’ with it (e.g. Farrell 2017; 
Fox-Brewster 2017; Samson 2017; Weissman 2015). Some search engines, for 
example Google, were accused of manipulating search results to fit dominant 
political agendas (Chmielewski and Bergen 2016). Google has, however, openly 
denied the accusations, and claimed that if many searched for negative things 
about one subject then the search index would automatically favour those results 
(Leswing 2016).
According to labelling theories, individuals might be influenced by terms 
that are used to describe them. Thus by stereotyping and defining someone to be 
something, the person might start to behave according to the label put on him or 
her (Lee et al. 2014; Meier 1976). Our findings show that most of our participants 
were aware of the deviant label attached to Darknet users. However, they do not 
appear to behave according to their labels—over two-thirds of the participants (12 
out of 17) have explicitly stated that ‘anonymity’ and ‘freedom’ are the two main 
reasons behind their initial and continued use of the Darknet. For some examples, 
see the three extracts below:
R1: ‘I have a strong interest in online privacy and anonymity. I am extremely 
concerned by the shift in global politics that seeks to demonise any dissent 
or alternative views to those held by the ruling elites who own self-serving 
interests are not those of the people they purport to represent. I find the 
Darknet community fascinating and enjoyable to engage with. I feel it is a 
human right to be able to have an exchange of views without fear of repris-
als or being labelled as a subversive’.
R4: ‘The most appealing feature is the ability to speak freely, without reper-
cussions; one can express unpopular opinions, without attracting undue 
attention to oneself. In some quarters, e.g. Saudi Arabia, even a hint as to 
a lack of faith can lead to charges of apostasy, with deadly consequences’.
R12: ‘I do think that anonymity attracts criminals and that the Darknet 
enforces that. However, there are many more honest people on the Darknet 
without criminal intentions. Anonymity is a universal human right’.
Extracts from responses on online forums, May 2016
Some of the participants mentioned that they initially used the Darknet for 
drug-related activities, but subsequently their activities have shifted to those of a 
more conventional, even positive nature. For two examples:
R6: ‘Originally as a mechanism to buy high quality, low cost weed and other 
drugs but over time the priority has changed, now more engaged in harm 
reduction and OPSEC awareness’.
R3: ‘Originally to buy drugs but now to participate in forums/the community’.
Extracts from responses on online forums, May 2016
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Darknet is not a society on its own
For some, the Darknet is gradually becoming a society of its own based on diverse 
ideologies, such as freedom, anonymity, and lack of regulations and central authori-
ties (Bartlett 2014; Simons 2014; Viney 2016). As a result, it might threaten social 
norms and conventions of our off-line societies. The consensus from our participants 
is that the Darknet is not a society on its own. Moreover, even if it becomes one, it 
would not threaten fundamental values of our off-line societies, partly because it 
lacks a solid infrastructure.
Most of our participants (14 out of 17) indicated that communities on the Darknet 
are detached from various real-world societies. Some of our participants (7 out of 
17) explained that this detachment is because the Darknet communities are mainly 
sustained by technological structures not human bonds. For two examples:
R1: ‘I think the Darknet community has actually disbanded to a greater extent. 
Back in the days of the Silk Road forums there was a huge and lively commu-
nity who congregated to discuss a large range of issues. I also think this is one 
of the reasons the US went after it so hard. Communities like the Hub are but a 
mere shadow of the former community. But as you have seen there are those of 
us who come here for shared values but there are too few of us to pose any real 
threat to the standard societal model’.
R3: ‘There are many communities of good people on there, but I don’t think 
they hold the power to make large scale changes in everyday society. The 
Internet is not real life’.
Extracts from responses on online forums, May 2016
However, the participant below prefers the Darknet to real world societies, and 
thinks it has some forms of rules of its own:
R12: ‘‘The ‘standard societal model’ is not the real thing. People are desperately 
trying to fit in but often get frustrated because they don’t. The Darknet-society is 
liberating in that sense. The interesting thing is that the Darknet regulates itself, it 
is not out of control, there are rules as well, just different rules. I like the Darknet 
better than the society authorities created. I love the diversity’.
An extract from responses on online forums, May 2016
Supporting the participant above, another participant claimed that the Darknet 
generates constructive socio-political values, which in turn influence off-line socie-
ties. His/her argument is clearly based on the assumption that off-line societies in 
some countries are dominated by certain privileged classes/individuals. For him/her, 
the Darknet could decentralise authoritarian powers and provide venues for demo-
cratic participation:
R16: ‘Somebody has to make sure the government does not abuse its power 
but in reality we have some institutions that are controlling everybody but they 
 M. Mirea et al.
are not being controlled by any other instance itself. Someone has to control 
the people who have control over other people.’
An extract from responses on online forums, May 2016
The Darknet marketplace Silk Road
Silk Road was one of the biggest black markets on the Darknet. As a result, it 
received a lot of media attention, especially attention concerning the trading of ille-
gal drugs on the Silk Road. More than half of our participants (11 out of 17) argued 
that the mainstream media was prejudiced against the virtual markets on the Dark-
net, deliberately altering the information to suit the real-world agenda of ‘war on 
drugs’. This coincides with Helms et al.’s (2012) view that media publicity generally 
generates fear of cyber-attacks. The participants further claimed that the media did 
not depict these markets in a balanced point of view. In fact, their way of portrayal 
was designed to infuse the public with fear. Two of our participants wrote:
R1: ‘The mainstream news media is nothing but a propaganda machine. It 
always misrepresents the facts in either sensationalist or deliberately misrep-
resentative ways to suit an agenda. I am therefore totally unsurprised that the 
media misrepresented what Silk Road was about or stood for…’
R11: ‘Well, it is understandable when the most famous page form the Darknet 
is a black market, selling drugs, weapons and other illegal things. And that the 
media will latch on to this is expected. It’s classic fear mongering. But in the 
ends, it’s like blaming a platform for what some users are doing, it’s like say-
ing Facebook is for bullying, because some selected people use it for bullying’.
Extracts from responses on online forums, May 2016
Some argued that by creating an online market with user feedback, Silk Road 
managed, in a way, to promote ‘safer’ drugs; and to also reduce the level of drugs 
on the streets and drug-related street violence (Afilipoaie and Shortis 2015; Buxton 
and Bingham 2015). Three of our participants asserted that Silk Road in fact offered 
safer drugs and less street-related violence. These positive aspects were provided 
by promoting quality through the feedback system and by moving the exchange of 
drugs online. Two of them wrote:
R1: ‘Silk Road for the first time introduced accountability into the drug trade 
for the end user. No longer could drug dealers get away with simply selling 
dangerous and adulterated products, if they tried they were outed quickly and 
driven from the market. Purchasing online also reduces the risk of harm by 
eliminating the need to associate with people who have traditionally been 
associated with using violence. The combination of these factors of course 
promotes ‘safer’ purchasing of drugs and only someone invested in making 
their money or deriving power and influence from enforcing the war on drugs 
could disagree with those facts’.
The not so dark side of the darknet: a qualitative study 
R4: ‘There have been numerous reports to that effect. If people don’t have to 
do business with dealers on the street, the prospect for violence is eliminated.
Extracts from responses on online forums, May 2016
The Darknet does not intrinsically breed criminal activities
Some media outlets, academic papers, and law enforcement agencies appear to 
depict the primary purpose of the Darknet as being a place for criminals to conduct 
their businesses (Décary-Hétu and Giommoni 2017; Fox-Brewster 2017; Horsman 
2017; Jeffray and Feakin 2015; McGoogan 2016; Moloney 2016; Weimann 2016). 
The Darknet has indeed offered new opportunities for criminal activities to flour-
ish. However, it is not fundamentally different from any other means of technologies 
and tools. For example, when the social platform—Twitter—was designed, the crea-
tors had no intention to promote terrorist activities, however, there are now known 
terrorist cells that seek to recruit people through Twitter (Yadron 2016). The Tor 
browser, the most popular browser used to access the Darknet, was created as a col-
laborative project between the US Naval Research Laboratory and the non-profit 
organisation Free Haven Project (Moore and Rid 2016).
Considering the negative image of the Darknet, the security industry, however, 
ought to be concerned and ought to investigate whether the Darknet can be used 
to harm the assets that they are protecting. The companies of Ashley Madison and 
Sony have been previously hacked, and the stolen private data were stored on the 
Darknet (Boorstin 2015; Lamont 2016). Although the hacking groups involved in 
these two hacks never mentioned whether the existence of Darknet had facilitated 
their activities, governments consider the Darknet as a threat to their security, and 
thus fear both the network and its users (Buxton and Bingham 2015; Décary-Hétu 
and Giommoni 2017; Jeffray and Feakin 2015). There have not been, however, a 
concrete study evidencing that the Darknet increases levels of criminality, and with-
out the Darknet, governments and companies are less likely to be attacked. Con-
sequently, the Darknet is considered by most of our research participants (13 out 
of 17) as just another tool that can be used by criminals. For example, four of our 
participants wrote:
R4: ‘…any tool or technology that could be turned to evil purpose. Steak 
knives can be used to cut your steak or murder your wife. Car can be used to 
kidnap children. It would be insane to think that anonymity and privacy tools 
are going to be any different. There are always going to be people who are 
going to commit crimes, and they are going to use *any* tools at their dis-
posal…’.
R1: ‘It may have given new opportunities to some, but you could use that argu-
ment for any innovation. Criminals often are the earliest adopters of new tech-
nology, you don’t hear people blaming Google for child porn, do you? In any 
society there will be those who exploit certain technology, should we therefore 
ban all future technological advancement in case it gets misused? Of course 
not, that would be ridiculous just like blaming the small number of people of 
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use the Darknet for nefarious reasons as a reason to taint everyone who uses 
it’.
R6: ‘Not exclusively. By demonizing the Darknet they are forgetting that there 
are many other attack vectors, some more viable than TOR itself, by which 
a determined attacker can compromise their security, information and opera-
tions. Companies should assume threats to their information and comput-
ing infrastructure can come from ANY attack vector and plan their strategy 
accordingly.
R4: ‘The Sony and Ashley Madison leaks were the end-result of poor secu-
rity planning and implementation on the part of the companies involved. With 
Sony, the department responsible for security was poorly-staffed, and even 
more poorly-funded… Requests for resources, manpower, etc. are routinely 
ignored’.
Extracts from responses on online forums, May 2016
Less than a third of participants (5 out of 17) recognised that the Darknet can be a 
dangerous place, but they rejected the claim that it is inherently criminogenic. They 
emphasised that the Darknet is a neutral place and it is the users that determine the 
criminality of the network. Further, they indicated that the Darknet was labelled as 
criminal in order to justify law enforce activities and government control. More than 
two-thirds of participants (12 out of 17) made it clear that everyone should have 
freedom over their actions without fear of reprisals. For three examples:
R16: ‘If you don’t explicitly search for child pornography you won’t find it. 
One has to differentiate. The Darknet can always be used and abused’.
R8: ‘The Darknet is not inherently criminal, just as the clear net is not inher-
ently criminal either. I’m sure that both have illegal content such as child porn 
or what have you. Albeit, there are also legal uses for both. The government 
creating an image that the Darknet is criminal is simply them trying to take 
away the human rights to privacy without legally doing so’.
R12: ‘This actually made me laugh. What a nonsense! You really have to put 
in a lot of effort to hurt yourself or others through the Darknet. No such thing 
can happen accidently. The Darknet is not a threat to society, not more than 
the clear net anyway! I indeed think law enforcement exaggerated it all, just 
because they don’t like admitting that they will never have everything under 
control’.
Extracts from responses on online forums, May 2016
The not so dark side of the darknet: a qualitative study 
Conclusion
In conclusion, this research is a small-scale exercise. To achieve a holistic under-
standing of the Darknet, much larger research projects that focus on its sociological 
dimensions would need to be undertaken. Our findings, however, have provided an 
alternative view of the Darknet in contrast to its current ‘dark’ image, which is con-
structed by the existing literature.
The Darknet can be viewed by some as the dark side of the Internet for valid 
reasons, which include its anonymous nature, virtual markets, and cryptocurren-
cies. However, most of our participants learned about it from conventional open 
sources. Once they start using the Darknet, freedom of expression becomes the main 
attraction sustaining their regular use of this network for many everyday activities. 
Despite the regular use, they do not, however, consider this network as a society. 
Without a solid and stable physical infrastructure that enables a sense of belonging, 
the Darknet is, and will always remain, a tool.
Even though many criminal activities take place on this network, the Darknet is 
not criminogenic. Many of these activities can also exist outside of it. Considering 
the virtual markets on the Darknet, most of our participants believe that the most 
famous one—the Silk Road—was used by governments and law enforcement agen-
cies as a propaganda tool to discredit the freedom that the Darknet could offer. Cer-
tainly, we cannot deny that the illegal trading of drugs is a predominant activity in 
many Darknet markets. However, there are some positives associated with this activ-
ity, such as better-quality drugs and less stress and violence.
We cannot, of course, deny that the Darknet presents a serious security risk. 
Because of its unique characteristics, such as anonymity, virtual markets, and the 
use of cryptocurrencies, a range of criminal activities could be performed in this 
network with ease. As a result, the Darknet ought to be investigated more seriously. 
Yet, it should be noted that its inherent purpose is not to harm individuals, organi-
sations, and societies. Instead of labelling an environment as criminogenic and its 
users as ‘deviant others’, a more holistic sociological understanding of the Darknet’s 
social characteristics and technological infrastructures is now needed. Findings from 
such research would help to improve security technologies and practices to better 
cope with some of the more unique characteristics of the Darknet identified above. 
The Darknet is not, ultimately, a society where crime is the norm. In fact, it is a 
technological platform that is used by different individuals for a variety of purposes.
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